

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 12 February 1963, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

(Mexico)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO FRANCO

Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. H. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIHEONOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. E.A. GOTTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Li j MIKAEL IIRU

ATO M. HAMID

ATO M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. IALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. S.P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA ALVARO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BIUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. W. WLECZOREK  
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVLESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. S. LÖFGREN  
Mr. ULF ERICSSON

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV  
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. L.J. MENDELJEVICH  
Mr. B.J. POKLAD

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. S. AHMED  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Sir Paul MASON  
Mr. J.K. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. V. BAKER  
Mr. D.E. MARK

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I declare open the ninety-sixth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

As Chairman, I have the honour and pleasure to greet the members of our Committee and to welcome the representative of the United States of America and our new co-Chairman of the Conference, Mr. William C. Foster; and Lij Mikael Imru of Ethiopia, whose collaboration will certainly be of great value for the successful despatch of our business.

The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today resumes its discussions after a recess which has lasted fifty-four days. We rose on 20 December 1962 with the purpose of achieving in this new year of 1963 a success which might open to the world a new prospect of tranquility and harmony. Our presence here is an act of faith in negotiation and in the rich results which are within reach of the perseverance and sincerity which we all bring to it. We are here because we are not discouraged by difficulties, nor intimidated by obstacles and because there is no weakening of our will to unite our efforts to achieve the aim to which we are committed: an effective agreement which will put an end to nuclear weapon tests and halt the armaments race, as the first essential steps to make thermonuclear war impossible and to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament.

This is not a routine resumption of negotiations that have been frequently interrupted; this fourth session that we are beginning today has a special significance. A new situation has arisen in the world. The great Powers are increasingly dependent on each other, and the growth of their political power lags far behind that of their nuclear power. The cold war is contagious, and in the long run may prove a disruptive factor contaminating those themselves who wage it.

It is essential to stimulate the moral forces which may make possible a lasting international co-operation for peace. Common principles and ideals are a unifying centripetal force more profound and lasting than common fear. The obstacles in the way of disarmament are not only military and technical but also, and perhaps to a greater degree, political and moral. Hatred and fear of the enemy are weaker bonds than understanding and a friendship rooted in common spiritual ideals. Never before have the great Powers so needed the co-operation and sympathy of the other Powers in order to create in the world a deeper-rooted and more stable equilibrium than that of fear of mutual destruction.

(The Chairman, Mexico)

The higher interests of self-preservation and universal survival have compelled governments to insist repeatedly on their determination to halt the arms race, to negotiate for disarmament and, as a first requirement, to ban nuclear weapon tests. International rivalry, mutual distrust and fear, and the belief that one can talk to the enemy only from a position of strength have fortunately not prevented States from seeking through negotiation an agreement which would ensure the peaceful resolution of their differences and the maintenance of peace. That is why we are here today, meeting again for the fourth time in a year, with the hope and intention that this Eighteen-Nation Committee - unfortunately still incomplete and truncated - shall make some progress in its work and co-operate effectively for solution of the most complex and difficult problem of all time.

Is there any likelihood that the discussions between the three nuclear Powers in Washington and New York, which did not achieve entirely satisfactory results, will now be successful when continued in the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests meeting in Geneva at the same time as the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament? However great our doubts may be, we must admit that it is possible to reach agreement, because if we did not believe that, we should not be here. This series of meetings which we are beginning today has a significance quite different from that of its predecessors, and we should be unwise to ignore its transcendence.

At the present moment, the international situation presents new complications which, whether foreseen or not, appear as new and dangerous obstacles to international and collective co-operation for the banning of nuclear weapon tests, and increase the threat of a widespread extension of nuclear weapons. What Powers will in the future co-operate in action to end the danger of thermonuclear war? Can the great Powers in the future - and not too late - achieve what they appear to desire and can still accomplish in this field; that is to say, to put an end to nuclear competition and the armaments race and consolidate the maintenance of peace? Hostile events are increasing, and new crises can lead us once again to the brink of war.

The world views with alarm the rate of growth of both thermonuclear and conventional armaments, which is being increased with the declared purpose of creating deterrents capable of preventing a nuclear holocaust. The great Powers are so intent on the formidable task of creating new reciprocal deterrents that they may in future lose their ability to deter other Powers both within and outside their own orbits.

(The Chairman, Mexico)

In every country cool-headed, shrewd thinkers are anxiously wondering whether the deterrent factors which are daily increasing in destructive capacity can have a real and permanent deterrent effect. We all recognize the urgency of concluding as soon as possible an agreement effectively banning nuclear weapon tests. The widespread extension of these weapons could create insoluble problems. In the future, new nuclear Powers could and might wish to speak from positions of strength, and deterrent factors of nationalist stamp would proliferate in the international community.

How much time is left? Forces acting in national political life, sometimes in opposition, may well obscure the objectives essential for the attainment of collective security, general peace, and the survival of mankind. The longer the time that elapses before an agreement is reached, the greater will be the difficulties. Passing attractions may snatch from our grasp the final objectives and the results which an expectant and fearful mankind regards as the best, the most lasting, and the most worthy of achievement. The responsibility of the nuclear powers and of ourselves is therefore all the greater; and the obligation to use this fresh opportunity to make genuine and definite progress in the task to which we are committed provides an opportunity not to be lost, which we have not the right to let slip by.

I am sure that all our representatives here today to resume the work of our Committee hold, as do our peoples and governments, that conviction and possess that will. I also think that everyone in this Committee shares the intention to avoid recriminations in the performance of our task and to take care that our attitudes and words do nothing to close the door to any possibility of agreement. We are seventeen representatives seeking agreement, united in the common will to achieve it. Let us have confidence in our determination to make this possible.

We have now ended the public part of this afternoon's meeting, and there will be a suspension of five minutes to allow those who are not participating directly in the work of the Conference to leave the Council chamber.

The meeting was suspended at 3.20 p.m. and resumed at 3.25 p.m.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind introduction and also for your remarks.

It is an honour and a pleasure to find myself at this table today as the representative of the United States in the company of so many distinguished representatives from other countries. I am occupying a place which has been familiar to the members of the Committee for the past many months as that of Ambassador Dean,

(Mr. Foster, United States)

and he has asked me to tell you, his colleagues and his friends, that he is sorry not to be re-joining you. Even though personal circumstances have made it impossible for him to continue his work here, he retains an active interest in this field as a consultant to our government, and he remains convinced of the absolute necessity for progress in the disarmament field.

This is a conviction which I share to the full. It explains the very existence of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the efforts of my government to reach meaningful agreements. Some things have already been accomplished in Geneva in clearing the path toward mutually acceptable understandings, but the bulk of our work still lies ahead. That fact impels us to apply ourselves to our task with renewed vigour in the coming weeks.

The President of the United States has stressed the importance of our efforts in a statement issued today. It reads:

"We look with hope to the work which begins in Geneva as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament meetings resume. Agreement does not lie within easy reach. The difficulties in reaching such an agreement can only be resolved if all parties face them in a spirit of willingness to negotiate - if there is a genuine spirit of co-operation coupled with a firm resolve to reverse the present dangerous trend of the arms race. The prospects of agreement on a test ban treaty now seem somewhat more encouraging than before because of the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the principle of on-site inspection, but very important questions remains to be worked out. We must seek an agreement that will serve the world's real interests by deserving and promoting confidence and trust among the nations.

"The United States also believes that measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications should be pressed with energy. Discussions to date have indicated a mutual interest in specific risk of war measures. This suggests that now may be the time actively to pursue these matters.

"It is clear then that the conference has before it new opportunities for serious negotiation.

"And if agreements here be coupled with further measures designed to contain the nuclear threat, then the more ambitious task of developing a broad-range programme for general and complete disarmament would surely proceed in an atmosphere of greater international confidence, stability and security."



(Mr. Foster, United States)

As far as my delegation is concerned, we recognize that all aspects of disarmament are crucial, starting from our dedication to the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament and proceeding through all of the many lesser measures which could bring significant relief to a tense world caught up in an unwanted armaments race. Accordingly our efforts here should, we believe, be directed systematically towards the achievement of progress on the whole range of possibilities that lie before us -- those on the agenda of the plenary meetings, those in the province of the Committee of the Whole and those before the test ban Sub-Committee. In the plenary meetings, we are in midstream in consideration of the agenda already adopted by this Conference. At the conclusion of our opening statements here we are prepared to resume consideration of items 5 b and 5 c (ENDC/1/Add.3 - ENDC/52). In connexion with those items, we hope that after the period of study allowed by the recess the Soviet Union will be able to provide helpful clarifications of Foreign Minister Gromyko's rather general proposal put forward in New York last September (A/PV.1127 (provisional), p.38).

The United States also hopes that in the coming weeks we can make rapid progress on measures to reduce the risk of war. As the delegations know, there appears to exist a considerable area of agreement in this field. Certain measures here are common to both the United States and Soviet plans. Specifically they are: improved communications, exchange of military missions and advance notification of major military movements. In order to facilitate consideration of this question, the United States submitted a working paper on this subject just prior to our recess (ENDC/70). In view of the inclusion of such measures in both the Soviet and United States plans, we should not have to spend our time discussing their value, but rather should concentrate on the modalities of how to put such measures into effect.

I hope that it will be possible, both in the co-Chairmen's meetings and in the Committee of the Whole, to deal with the opportunities presented by the present area of accord in a realistic fashion. Our purpose in this regard is the achievement of specific agreements in the very near future. The United States is prepared to hold the necessary discussions of technical matters as soon as we can reach general agreement on the substantive aspects of the three proposals.

At this moment, however, we feel that one particular question merits the preponderance of our immediate attention. I refer, of course, to the problem of concluding a treaty for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. I believe that there is some reason to hope that a test ban agreement may be on the way, for it does seem to us that the basic ingredient of success -- a desire for agreement by both nuclear sides -- may now exist. Certainly it does on our side.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Let us hope the year and a half of seeking to recreate a common basis of negotiation is over. Our debates can now stand on the platform built in the exchange of letters between President Kennedy (ENDC/74) and Chairman Khrushchev (ENDC/73). We can proceed to enlarge the area of agreement defined by that exchange. In the view of the United States Government, this task is one of the most urgent assignments this Committee has. Serious and concentrated negotiations are now called for. Propaganda has no place in this effort.

I think it would promote progress in these talks if we could all secure a more or less common understanding of the kind of verification which is now the subject of negotiations. Although not yet precisely defined, that verification system is substantially different from the kinds of systems this Committee was discussing before the recess. That is the central fact of the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. It is a fact which has been obscured by a debate over numbers: it is a fact, none the less, which is far broader than the present much-publicized inspection quota controversy. Since both sides now seem to be talking about the same basic kind of verification system, I shall take a few minutes to describe its essential features.

First, the system now under discussion is premised on the use of nationally owned and operated detection networks. Those national stations would submit data regularly and in a uniform manner to an international data-collection centre. At the recent meetings in New York and Washington, the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged preliminary lists of seismograph stations from which the data-gathering arm of the verification system might be selected. Such selected stations in each other's territory would form the basic network, and the United States has given the Soviet Union a general description of the type of instruments used at each of the United States stations.

The second element of the new verification system involves the use of automatically recording seismograph stations. Such stations could supplement the data collected by national stations and could help to a degree in detecting, locating and identifying seismic events, thus improving the capabilities of the verification system.

At the private meetings which took place during the recess, the United States suggested ten sites in United States territory where automatic recorders might be located. The United States delegation furnished information on the average seismic noise levels at those sites. The Soviet Union accepted one of the United States sites, declined the other nine, and requested two others in their place. The United States said that it did not object to the two alternative sites, and gave the Soviet Union noise-level data for those two sites as well.

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The United States specified ten general areas within the Soviet territory where automatic recorders might well be located. Those areas correspond to known areas of high seismicity in the Soviet Union. The United States asked the Soviet Union to designate specific sites for automatic stations within those ten areas, to be recommended by the Soviet Government on the basis of its knowledge of the noise level and other local factors. The areas specified by the United States include the areas of the three sites suggested by the Soviet Union, but the United States did not accept the Soviet contention that there need only be three such automatic stations.

Later on, in the private talks, the United States suggested that its requirements might be met with seven automatic stations if satisfactory assurances could be obtained concerning the characteristics of the Soviet national seismograph network. There was no reciprocal response by the Soviet Union, which continued to state that the three sites specified in Chairman Khrushchev's letter of 7 January would be sufficient and that no additional sites could be contemplated. Noise-level data for the three Soviet-suggested sites were produced by the Soviet Union at the last session of the private talks.

The third element of the new verification system involves on-site inspections. We are unable, however, to report the extent of areas of agreement on this subject. We have had no response from the Soviet Union to our specific suggestions about basic features of this element of the verification system. For the moment, therefore, this Committee will simply have to take note of the fact that the on-site inspection quota concept, first advanced officially by the Soviet Government in 1959 and then repudiated by it in 1961, has once again been accepted by the Soviet Government. At the private talks in New York and Washington, the United States explained its views on appropriate general conditions under which on-site inspections should take place. We inquired whether the Soviet Union foresaw any serious difficulties in negotiating an agreement along lines envisaged by the United States. We received no answer.

To summarize: the important thing is that we have a new premise for negotiations. We are now talking about a verification system based on national manned detection stations, automatic seismic stations and a quota of on-site inspections. In private talks, we progressed in some details beyond the points covered in the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. Essentially, however, we did not succeed, in the private talks, in enlarging substantially the area of agreement achieved in the exchange of letters. This is the immediate task before us.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The fact that last month's conversations did not achieve their objective can be explained, it seems to us, by one basic reason. This is that the Soviet representatives were willing to talk about only a few of the matters still unresolved. Even on those few points they were not ready to consider President Kennedy's suggestions to Chairman Khrushchev that the far-reaching Western moves of the past four years be matched by some equivalent Soviet advance. In other words, the Soviet delegation wanted to speak only about its own number of unmanned seismic stations and about its own annual number of inspections, as set forth in Chairman Khrushchev's letters of 19 December and 7 January last. It insisted that the United Kingdom and the United States had no choice but to accept the Soviet Union's figures in each case, that is, three unmanned stations and two to three inspections.

The Western representatives, on the other hand, made known the flexibility of their position in a number of ways. For example, at the outset of the talks we of the West said that, on the basis of our present information, we considered ten unmanned stations each, in the United States and the Soviet Union, to be necessary to supplement the national network of existing detection stations. During the recent meetings, however, as I have just pointed out, we did state that seven such unmanned stations might be sufficient if the Soviet Union would furnish us with satisfactory data about the capabilities of its national network and if it would reconfirm its offer of last summer to build new manned national stations where necessary to augment the system.

Similarly, based on our best information, up to ten annual inspections seem to us to be technically essential. Nonetheless, we stated clearly that we would re-evaluate this conclusion if the Soviet delegation could give us the scientific information which it claims to have and which might, if correct, substantially reduce the residual number of unidentified seismic events in a normal year. We then outlined United States views on the general procedures under which the United States contemplated that on-site inspections would be carried out. We requested the Soviet Union's comments, but received no answer despite repeated requests. We were told only that the discussion of such details would be premature until the Western Powers accepted the Soviet position of three annual inspections and three unmanned stations.

The justification which has been offered to us by Soviet representatives for their demands has been that the Soviet Union is not now interested in bargaining. They say that they have just made a major move forward to meet the Western position by agreeing to on-site inspections, and that this demonstrates how much the Soviet Union desires a test ban treaty. They add, moreover, that, since haggling over details would prevent

(Mr. Foster, United States)

rapid conclusion of a treaty, the Soviet Union decided to put all of its cards on the table right away. Thus, the Soviet figures are not a first offer, subject to bargaining, but the final Soviet position.

We have expressed our concern at this Soviet negotiating approach. After all, President Kennedy's letter of 28 December 1962 made it clear that he regarded the Soviet offer of two to three inspections per year to be insufficient. In the face of this belief of the Head of our Government, we have not been able to understand why the Soviet Government decided to enter into private talks in January unless it was ready to exercise some negotiating flexibility. And, I may say, some flexibility is still essential in Geneva if an agreement is to be made possible. After all, in line with technical advances, we have reduced our proposal of February 1960 from twenty inspections per year, first to a sliding scale in May 1961 of between twelve and twenty inspections per year, and now to eight to ten inspections annually, provided, of course, there are appropriate arrangements. In spite of Soviet acceptance in 1960, and repudiation in 1961, of fifteen international control posts on Soviet territory, we have agreed now to rely on national seismic stations, supplemented by seven to ten automatic seismic stations.

The United States and United Kingdom delegations have thus shown that they can be flexible within the rock-bottom limits imposed by the present state of scientific knowledge in seismology. However, we must know the parameters of the problem with which we are grappling. We must see in clear detail how many seismic events the proposed world-wide system will be likely to detect and identify so that we will have some idea of how many residual unidentified events will be eligible for inspection. We cannot accept any number of inspections in the annual quota which does not allow the inspection of a reasonable proportion to such events. We must also ask about the general outline of provisions to be adopted to determine how on-site inspections will work in practice before we can commit ourselves to any fixed number of automatic recording stations and on-site inspections.

The Soviet Union has implied that the United Kingdom and the United States wish to put off the conclusion of a test ban through a discussion of technical detail. We agree that much of the technical detail of a test ban agreement can be left to the treaty drafters. But there are a number of important features of an inspection arrangement which are not mere details at all, but which are essential to ensure the effectiveness of inspections as a deterrent and as a contribution to the confidence of both sides. It would be of little use to agree upon a number of inspection

(Mr. Foster, United States)

however acceptable to both sides, if the arrangements for them were so unclear that any party being inspected were given the means to keep those inspections from being carried out in an efficient and meaningful manner. We are convinced that agreement on a quota number cannot be reached on a sensible and technically justified basis unless we, at the same time, know the major characteristics of the inspection process, such as: first, the nationality of inspection teams; second, the criteria which would make an event eligible for inspection; third, the extent of the area to be inspected; and, fourth, the arrangements by which events would be chosen for inspection.

The answers to those questions can be crucial in determining whether ten inspections, for example, will be necessary or, indeed, whether any number, however large, would have any significance. All of our general proposals on these issues are now on the table or have been made clear to the Soviet delegation. Thus far the Soviet delegation has refused to comment on them.

We agree with the Soviet Union that the conclusion of a test ban treaty is a political act and, indeed, an act of the highest importance. We reject the Soviet contention, however, that the provisions for the control system can also be decided solely on a political basis, without regard for objective scientific considerations. We must, therefore, continue to be guided by our best understanding of the current technical situation, and this will inevitably prescribe for us the outer bounds of any agreement.

It is for those reasons that we must so strongly urge our Soviet colleagues to abandon their attitude of "take it or leave it"; it is time for them to come down to hard facts, to the basic requirements of the control system which they are now proposing. We do not by any means call for a discussion of secondary or subsidiary issues, but we are asking for clarification and careful negotiation of some of the fundamental questions of a test ban.

All the issues I have mentioned are crucial matters. We say that they all have a bearing on the determination of the answer to one of the two quantitative questions which the Soviet Union is ready to put on our agenda, namely, the annual number of inspections. We feel that we cannot decide on this point in a vacuum, and the same is true for the question of the number and the locations of unmanned seismic stations. Those are the issues which face us and which the Soviet delegation alone can answer. This is why we look to the Soviet delegation to answer the fundamental questions which we have posed. This is why we are convinced that the key to progress in our work still rests primarily in the hands of Mr. Kuznetsov, Mr. Tsarapkin and their colleagues.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

It is the hope of the United States delegation that this session of our Conference will be noted not for its debates, but for its specific accomplishments. We will do the world little good if all we produce is records for historians. Let us rather produce agreements. The United States delegation is here to do business.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, permit me first of all to express my gratitude for the greetings you addressed to the members of the Committee. In response to your appeal, I should like to say that the Soviet delegation has been instructed to do everything to overcome the difficulties standing in the way of the fulfilment of the tasks set before the Committee. We are confident that if the other delegations show the same constructive approach to the matter, we shall be able to achieve success in the work of the Committee.

The attention of world opinion, the attention of all the peoples, is once again directed to the Palais des Nations at Geneva, where the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is today resuming its work. The peoples, particularly in recent years, have been pinning on the disarmament negotiations their hopes for a better future, for a peaceful life, for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. But their hopes have still not been realized. So far, not only has no agreement on disarmament been achieved, but the nuclear armaments race is developing in the world with increasing intensity.

If we analyse the situation which is now developing as a result of this armaments race, it is not difficult to understand why the peoples are becoming more and more anxious. States have already accumulated enormous stockpiles of deadly atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons, which can be delivered in one way or another to practically any target. Every month, if not every day, these weapons are being further improved, their lethal power and range of action is being increased and a real threat of the further proliferation of these weapons is being created.

Recent measures taken by the Western Powers to intensify the nuclear arms race and the further spread of nuclear weapons are arousing particular anxiety amongst all those who cherish peace. We are referring to the United Kingdom-United States agreement at Nassau concerning atomic submarines carrying Polaris rockets with nuclear warheads, the plans for a so-called multilateral nuclear force for NATO, the military treaty between France and Germany, the steps taken by the United States to impose nuclear weapons on Canada, the resumption of nuclear tests by the United States of America, and certain other measures.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

What, then, is the situation? At a time when negotiations on disarmament are being conducted in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the Western Powers are displaying feverish activity in preparing long-term plans for further increasing and improving nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. These plans lead to an intensification of international tension and increase the threat of a nuclear war.

If we take, for instance, the plan for a multilateral nuclear force for NATO or the conclusion of a military treaty between France and Germany, it becomes obvious that in taking these steps the Western Powers are raising the nuclear arms race to a new level and are leading up to giving access to nuclear weapons, in one form or another, to other Western countries, especially Western Germany, where revanchist military circles are in power. Statements to the effect that, for instance, the plan for establishing a multilateral nuclear force for NATO does not provide for putting nuclear weapons directly into the hands of the West German revanchists are intended only to confuse world public opinion. The Soviet Government categorically protests against all these plans, draws the attention of members of the Committee to the danger of such a policy to the cause for peace and declares that this policy is contrary to the very purpose of disarmament negotiations.

We draw the attention of the participants in the negotiations and of everyone who is interested in their successful outcome to the fact that the Government of the United States of America, by resuming nuclear tests on 8 February 1963 in defiance of the will of the peoples who unanimously demand that an end be put to the contamination of the earth's atmosphere, and in defiance of the appeal of the United Nations General Assembly for the cessation of all nuclear tests not later than 1 January 1963 (A/RES/1762A(XVII)- ENDC/63), has taken a step which can only intensify the nuclear arms race and have the most adverse effect on our negotiations, which will be seriously complicated thereby.

In the light of all this, it is difficult not to form the impression that we are confronted with an attempt to turn this Committee on disarmament, like its predecessors of mournful memory, into a fruitless debating society, or a screen for concealing the armaments race.

But recent events, and especially the recent crisis in the Caribbean area, during which the hot breath of thermonuclear war was felt to be so close, make the reaching of agreement on disarmament problems still more necessary and urgent. It is inadmissible that a foreign policy, which merely leads from one relay of the armaments race to another and intensifies the danger of a sudden conflict between the



(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

nuclear Powers and the threat of war, should prevail in the world. We all know only too well what a thermonuclear war would cost mankind.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, who regards disarmament as the most important problem of the modern world, stressed the following in his statement at Berlin on 16 January 1963:

"What would happen if all these nuclear weapons were to fall upon the heads of human beings? According to the calculations of scientists, 700-800 million people would perish as a result of the first strike alone. All the large towns, not only of the two leading nuclear Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, but also of France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, China, Japan and many other countries of the world would be wiped off the face of the earth and destroyed. The effects of an atomic and hydrogen war would be felt throughout the life span of many generations, causing disease, death and the most monstrous development of man."

This is the harsh truth, and no State should forget it in determining its policy.

It is now recognized by all that the one radical and effective measure which will lead to the elimination of the threat of war from the life of human society is general and complete disarmament, that is to say, the total elimination of the armed forces and armaments of all States. It was on the basis of this premise that the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 1722(XVI) assigned to our Committee as its principal task the preparation of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament and the reaching of agreement on it.

We are obliged to note, however, that after a year's work, the Committee has made practically no progress in carrying out its main task. It is unpleasant for us to speak of this, but it is better to call a spade a spade if we wish to have a sober realization of the real situation, without which we cannot take a single step forward.

Permit me to say that it is not the Soviet Union that is responsible for the lack of progress in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. We, for our part, have done and are doing everything possible to ensure progress and to get the negotiations on general and complete disarmament out of the deadlock. Everyone will no doubt remember that a year ago, at the first meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the Soviet Government submitted to the Committee for its consideration a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2\*).

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Subsequently, the Soviet Government, after carefully studying the course of the discussions in the Committee, introduced a number of additions and clarifications into this draft which took into account the position of our partners in the negotiations, and, in particular, it agreed to an extension of the period for the implementation of disarmament measures on which the Western Powers so strongly insisted (ENDC/2/Rev.1).

Later, when it became apparent that considerable differences had arisen between the sides in connexion with the refusal of our Western partners to accept the Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government took, in this matter also, a considerable step to meet the Western Powers. The Soviet Government still considers that the best solution, the one which would ensure the most rapid elimination of the threat of nuclear war, would be to eliminate all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles without exception in the first stage. Nevertheless, in response to the statements of the governments of the Western Powers that they made their agreement to disarmament dependent on the need for additional safeguards for the security of States during the disarmament process, the Soviet Government made a serious concession and agreed that the Soviet Union and the United States should retain until the end of the second stage a strictly limited number of inter-continental missiles, anti-missiles and anti-aircraft defence missiles (ENDC/2/Rev.1, art.5). In this connexion, I should like to stress that the Soviet Union's position is flexible and constructive.

The Soviet Union is prepared also in the future to show a constructive approach and to seek mutually acceptable solutions to specific problems in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament which will be carried on in the Committee. It should be borne in mind, however, that concessions cannot be made by one side only. They must be made by both sides; otherwise it will be impossible to reach agreement. We should like to express the hope that the United States and the other Western Powers will also adopt in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament an attitude which will help us to move forward.

A thorough examination of the concrete situation which now exists in the world has led the Soviet Government to the conclusion that, while continuing to regard the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament as its principal task, the Committee should at the same time consider as a matter of urgent priority the question of certain measures which might immediately diminish the threat of a nuclear war. The increasing danger of a devastating thermonuclear war is a matter of the greatest concern to the peoples, who are expecting the nuclear Powers to take immediate constructive steps to eliminate this threat.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

The facts show that among the measures which would contribute in the highest degree to the achievement of this goal and which might at the same time substantially facilitate agreement on general and complete disarmament, the one which comes to the fore in the present conditions is the renunciation by States of the use of foreign territories for the location of various types of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

It is no secret to anyone that the establishment in foreign territory of bases for submarines carrying nuclear missiles and the location in such territory of other strategic means of delivery intended for the purpose of dealing a nuclear blow to the vital centres of other countries greatly aggravates the international situation and increases the danger of war. Yet it is precisely in this direction that particular activity is being displayed on the part of certain Powers in recent times. In this connexion, it suffices to refer to the plans of the Western Powers which I have already mentioned and which provide for basing atomic submarines carrying Polaris rockets with nuclear warheads in foreign ports. Is it possible not to see what a danger there is in using foreign territory for the location of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons? No submarine with nuclear missiles based on an international port, no missile with a thermonuclear warhead located in the territory of a foreign State for the purpose of striking at the vital centres of other countries and no strategic bomber with a load of hydrogen bombs waiting at a foreign military airport to take off for this purpose can be regarded otherwise than as a weapon of aggression.

Attempts to make out that the substitution of atomic submarines with Polaris missiles for foreign land missile bases constitutes a solution to the problem of missile bases on foreign territory are without any foundation. It is impossible not to see that this kind of substitution by no means removes the danger involved in the use of foreign territory for preparing a nuclear strike directed at other countries.

Of course, a radical solution to the problem would consist in the complete elimination of all military bases on foreign territory, both those in which the strategic means of delivering nuclear weapons are located and all the other bases. The Soviet Government has repeatedly proposed the implementation of such a measure, basing itself on the interests of consolidating peace. Taking into account, however, that the most urgent matter is the renunciation by States of the use of foreign territory for the siting of strategic means of delivering nuclear weapons, the Soviet Government deems it possible and appropriate to single out this specific question from the overall problem of eliminating military bases on foreign territory and to settle it immediately without waiting for an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

On instructions from the Soviet Government, we are submitting to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territory for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75). This draft provides that within a short period, on which it will be necessary to reach agreement, the States concerned will renounce the use of foreign ports for basing submarines with nuclear missiles and aircraft carriers carrying on board aircraft with atomic and thermonuclear bombs; they will renounce the stationing on foreign territory of intermediate and long-range missiles with nuclear warheads and strategic bombers armed with nuclear weapons. The implementation of these measures would be a great contribution to the prevention of war.

I should like particularly to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the fact that the Soviet Government, in submitting this draft declaration, is proposing the implementation of what is, for all its importance, actually a very simple measure. It is not a question of destroying or even reducing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons - no, we are merely proposing that the use of foreign territory for the stationing of these vehicles should cease and that they should be withdrawn from such territory and not introduced there in future. The simplicity of this measure, it seems to us, should facilitate its implementation.

We express the hope that the participants in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, realizing their great responsibility towards the peoples, will proceed with due attention to the consideration of the draft declaration we have put forward as a most important and urgent matter and that agreement will be reached in the Committee on the basis of this draft.

The Soviet Government is firmly convinced that an important measure leading to the cessation of the nuclear armaments race and to the solution of the problem of disarmament would also be the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests for all time.

On no international issue, it seems, have so many negotiations taken place or so many meetings and conferences been held as on the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Nevertheless, this question is still unresolved, because the Western Powers, by creating artificial difficulties, are all the time preventing its solution.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Let us recall some of the past history. At one time the Western Powers refused altogether to negotiate on the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. Subsequently, they expressed their readiness to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of tests, but at the same time put forward absolutely exorbitant demands regarding international control, which only showed that the Western Powers were anxious to take advantage of the solution of the problem of the cessation of tests in order to establish a comprehensive system of international espionage. Later, when a worldwide movement in favour of the cessation of tests developed and when national means of detecting nuclear explosions had been considerably improved, it was no longer possible for the Western Powers to insist on their demands for the establishment of international control over the cessation of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. They then tried to make underground nuclear explosions a stumbling block by asserting that without international control it was impossible to verify that States were complying with their obligations to cease such tests. Everything possible was put forward in order to prove the need for the establishment of this control, although the data of science and practical experience show the adequacy of national systems for detecting underground tests as well. In spite of the facts, the Western Powers tried to convince us of the need to locate a large number of international control posts on the territory of the Soviet Union and to carry out numerous on-site inspections in the territory of the Soviet Union.

As the participants in the Committee are well aware, the Soviet Union has many times taken steps in order to find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of control over the cessation of all nuclear tests, including underground tests, and to seek for a compromise in this matter also. In this very hall in April 1962 we announced the readiness of the Soviet Government to reach agreement with the Western Powers (ENDC/32) on the basis of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States Members of the Committee, which envisages a series of measures for verifying the fulfilment by all States of their obligations in regard to the cessation of nuclear tests. However, the Western Powers refused to take this memorandum as a basis for the preparation of such an agreement.

In November 1962, the Soviet Government, being anxious to bring the positions closer together, took yet another important step to meet the Western Powers. It announced its readiness to agree to the location of automatic seismic stations on the territories of the nuclear Powers, which would be used for checking the data received from the national detection systems. (ENDC/SC.1/IV.43, p. 26)

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Sincerely desiring to break the deadlock and to arrive, at last, at a mutually acceptable agreement, the Soviet Government quite recently went even further to meet the Western Powers and agreed to the carrying out of two to three inspections annually on the territory of each of these Powers in cases where this was considered necessary. In specifying the number of inspections, the Soviet Union took into account the views expressed by the United States of America on this question also. We agreed to this because our partners in the negotiations repeatedly stated that they would be ready to come to an agreement if the Soviet Union would accept the principle of on-site inspection. We were repeatedly told that this was the main outstanding obstacle and that it had to be overcome for internal reasons as well, and that if the Soviet Union were to agree to a compromise in this matter, agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear tests, including underground tests, would be achieved without any particular difficulty.

We took into consideration all the arguments put forward by the Western Powers and, being anxious to remove the last obstacle remaining in the path to the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, we agreed to the carrying out of two to three inspections annually on the territory of each nuclear Power, although we still consider that there is no practical need for such inspections.

For the Soviet Union there is no question as to whether an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests should or should not be concluded. We are in favour of its being concluded. The world wishes to know now whether the Western Powers intend at last to agree to the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, or whether they are only concerned with carrying out one new series of experimental nuclear explosions after another. In this connexion, it is necessary to receive a clear and straightforward reply from the United States of America as to what constitutes the real aim of its policy -- the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests to which now, after all the constructive steps of the Soviet Union, there are and should be no further obstacles, or the continuation of tests. We consider it our duty to inform the members of the Committee that during the negotiations in Washington and New York in the second half of January 1963, we received no reply to this question. The present resumption of experimental nuclear explosions in the State of Nevada in flagrant violation of the resolution of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly which called on the nuclear Powers to cease all tests as from 1 January 1963, can leave no doubt as to the intentions of the United States of America.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

A treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests can be concluded straight away and the Soviet Union is ready to set about this work immediately. We appeal to the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom and to all the members of the Committee to do everything in their power to achieve success in this important matter.

We consider that the conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests would be a great contribution towards a general improvement of the international situation and towards the consolidation of peace.

According to the firm conviction of the Soviet Government, a useful and necessary task is to achieve the speediest possible agreement also on other measures aimed at reducing international tension, strengthening confidence between States and creating more favourable conditions for solving the problem of general and complete disarmament. In its resolution 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962, the General Assembly of the United Nations called upon our Committee to give its attention to such measures.

The relevant measures are already on the agenda of the Committee and include, above all, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty and the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty.

It would indeed be difficult to overestimate the importance of such a pact for strengthening confidence between States and clearing the international atmosphere of the miasmas of hostility and mutual distrust. To the Warsaw Pact, on the one hand, and to the North Atlantic Treaty on the other, belong those States which at present possess the greatest military power, including all the nuclear Powers. If these States were to give, before all mankind, a solemn undertaking not to attack one another and, in the relations between the two groups of States, not to have recourse to force in any way that would be incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, then such an agreement would be greeted by all the nations of the world with a deep sigh of relief. The threat of war would recede and the non-aggression pact would become an important instrument for preventing international crises.

In the course of the work of the Committee, the Soviet delegation will submit concrete proposals in regard to such a non-aggression pact.

Important measures such as the creation of nuclear-free zones in Central Europe, Africa and a number of other regions of the world, as well as other measures, would also help to consolidate general peace, lessen the danger of war and create favourable conditions for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government is ready to make its contribution to the solution of all these important questions.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Life itself has set before the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament serious and responsible tasks. It is to a large extent on whether the Committee will make progress towards their solution or whether as in the past it will merely mark time that the further development of international events depends. The Soviet Government and all the Soviet people firmly believe that a real possibility exists for ensuring that these events develop in a direction which will be favourable to mankind. We are convinced that just as there is no fatal inevitability of war, so is there no ineluctable necessity to continue the armaments race.

The world can and should follow a different path, namely, that of eliminating international tension and reaching agreement on disarmament problems. This would give an unprecedented stimulus to the further development and expansion of the economy of States and to scientific and technical progress directed towards the cause of peace rather than towards the needs for the preparation of war.

Recent experience, including the experience of the peaceful settlement of the Caribbean crisis, shows that even the most complex and difficult problems can be successfully resolved if the parties concerned approach these problems from a position of reasonableness and realistically appraise the existing situation. It is from these positions that all of us should approach the solution of disarmament problems.

At the session of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union in December 1962, the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, described the basic content of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as follows:

"The Leninist principle of peaceful co-existence is the general line of our foreign policy. This is the banner of all socialist States. This is the cherished goal of all peoples. Let wisdom triumph over senselessness. Let the method of negotiation in order to settle contentious issues in international life replace for ever the dangerous methods of trials of strength. The peoples of the world can and must at last find peace of mind and not fear lest the morrow may bring them a thermonuclear conflict. Mankind wishes to build its future not on rubble, not on smoking ruins, but rather on the material foundation which has already been created by the labour of many generations."



(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Guided by this general line in its foreign policy, the Soviet Government is sparing and will continue to spare no effort to achieve practical results in the negotiations on disarmament. We call on all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to do likewise. By our joint efforts we can and should succeed in solving the problems of disarmament. We can and must free the peoples from the threat now hanging over them of a war of extermination.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom delegation is very glad indeed to be again in Geneva to resume the discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I should like to say how glad I am to see around the table so many old faces, so many old friends with whom we have discussed these matters in the past -- some who have been with the problem throughout, others whom we are glad to welcome back, like Mr. Kuznetsov, who has just spoken and who was with us last summer. I hope that his return to join us on this occasion presages a new attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to secure real agreement. We also welcome our new colleagues from Ethiopia and the United States; we are glad to have them with us, too.

Before passing from these general introductory remarks, I should like to say a word about the former leader of the United States delegation, Mr. Arthur Dean, who is no longer associated with us here. He worked hard and long, he had heavy responsibilities as one of the co-Chairmen of the Conference, and I should like to pay tribute to his sincerity and integrity throughout the whole period of his association.

At this resumption, I should like to spend just a moment or two on the procedures of our Conference. I hope that we shall have agreed procedures which are workmanlike and sensible, and I very much hope that our two co-Chairmen will be able to assist us materially in this respect. I presume that we shall be resuming on the basis of three plenary meetings each week to be held normally in the mornings. I should also like to see the nuclear Sub-Committee re-established as soon as possible; and I would venture the hope that we may see the Committee of the Whole revived because I believe that Committee can and should be doing useful work.

We have heard references from both the previous speakers this afternoon to some of the collateral measures, which I think interest us all. I have always held the view that if we could reach agreement on some of these less enormous problems it would help us forward in our consideration of the massive programme of general and complete disarmament. I therefore make that plea to my colleagues, that we may be able to see the Committee of the Whole resuming once more.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I would repeat that, as I have said so many times in the past, I hope we shall have the maximum of informal consultation amongst ourselves -- and in particular that applies to our two co-Chairmen. I never begrudge any amount of over-work done by our two co-Chairmen. I think they should be stimulated to the maximum, and none of us will mind; we will not mind if they do lose a little sleep in order to do this. I believe that a great deal of good comes from the meetings of the co-Chairmen, and I give them my good wishes and hope they will be able to make progress.

I hope we are going to get back to serious, sensible debate, devoid of polemics as far as possible, and I should like to see us get back to orderly debate in the various items of general and complete disarmament which confront us. We have not got very far through our agreed agenda in document ENDC/52, paragraph 5 of which sets out the various matters which we should be discussing. Indeed, when we broke off for the Christmas recess this agenda was a little in a disorderly state because we had gone back to consider items 5 b and 5 c together. I do not complain about that, because it was logical that we should do so as a result of the new position of the Soviet Union announced by Mr. Gromyko at the General Assembly in relation to nuclear delivery vehicles (A/PV.1127(provisional), p.38), it was obvious that our Soviet colleagues would want to apprise us more fully of their views on this, and that we should all want to comment. I hope we can conclude our discussion of this. We in the West are still awaiting answers to certain of our questions on this matter, but I think we could probably soon conclude discussion of this item and go on to paragraph 5 d, on which we had of course just started. We could then work through the various matters. Whatever our views on this, I think it would help us if we had orderly debate. I hope that this will be the case, and I would venture to hope that we could once again try to indicate in advance what particular topics it is intended to discuss on any particular day.

In saying this I am, of course, in no way seeking to inhibit discussion on the matter which I know is uppermost in the minds of many of us and which took up a very considerable part of both the speeches to which we have listened this afternoon, namely, the question of a ban on nuclear tests; and, of course, it is right and proper that we should allocate a plenary meeting to this particular subject whenever required by delegations. All I am asking is that we should have orderly debate; that we should decide in advance for particular days the subjects we will be discussing.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I hope we will be able to make progress on these various issues. We must not be discouraged by the fact that we have not made a great deal of progress yet. I certainly do not look on this Conference as -- in the words Mr. Kuznetsov used -- a debating society. This is a Conference with very heavy responsibilities, and I want to see us make far greater progress on all these issues.

I should like in passing to make one or two comments on several of the points which our Soviet colleague raised this afternoon. I was sorry that he was so despondent on some of those issues, and I thought it was a little odd that he should charge the West with bad faith once more -- because that is what it really amounted to. We hear this so often from our Soviet colleagues, and I do not think it really helps. I think the basic thing to remember is that until there is some clear agreement on these issues of disarmament, obviously all the countries concerned are going to continue to watch their own national security to the full, whether it be the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union or anyone else. Until we have clear agreements, and confidence that those agreements are going to be fulfilled, we are not going to have a sudden cessation in the development of all weapons. Regrettable though that may be, it is a simple fact which it would be folly for us not to accept.

Therefore, when Mr. Kuznetsov talks about the Western Powers developing feverish activity and raising the nuclear armaments race to a new level of activity, I would ask him -- though I do not wish to be in any way controversial -- what evidence he has given to us that the Soviet Union is not also going ahead at full speed with its nuclear weaponry? This is something which one has to face: until we have agreement, how can we prevent countries from going ahead? After all, it was the Soviet Union which resumed the arms race in the nuclear field to a very large degree by its unilateral resumption of nuclear tests in the autumn of 1961, and it was the Soviet Union which developed, and explained to the world that it had developed, the 100-megaton bomb. I am merely recording that, not in any controversial sense, but in order to put in perspective what Mr. Kuznetsov has been saying to us this afternoon. I would say, by all means let us get agreement to stop the armaments race, but let us not pretend that one country is more virtuous than the others in relation to that at the present time.

I think if we are clear-headed in relation to this, it is a self-evident fact that each country seeks to ensure its own ultimate national security in the best way that it sees open to it.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

In the same context, I would say to Mr. Kuznetsov that I do not accept his definition of what was done in the Nassau agreement in the proposals for the creation of a NATO multilateral force. I do not accept for one moment his suggestions when he says -- and I tried to take down his words at the time -- that the statement that those arrangements were not to help Western Germany to obtain control of nuclear weapons was merely to confuse world opinion. It is not merely to confuse world opinion: it is a direct statement of fact that any country within the NATO alliance which is not at the present time a nuclear Power will not obtain control of nuclear weapons. I say that emphatically, and I say that the Western Powers are guided by General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI), adopted on 4 December 1962, of which I quote the first operative paragraph:

"Calls upon all States, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons;"

I would say to our Soviet colleague that the United Kingdom considers that any arrangements which have been come to are strictly in accordance with that paragraph of that resolution: that we stand by that declaration. It is a firm one, and I believe that goes just as much for our United States colleagues as for ourselves. This is a position on which I think we cannot be too categorical: that there is no intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to assist in spreading the possession nationally of nuclear weapons by countries not now possessing them, and we give that categorical assurance.

I hope we will not have charges of that sort, which really do not stand up against what in fact has been done, and I think that charges of that sort do not really help us in our work here. I should like to see us making more progress in relation to defining more clearly our general positions in all these matters, but I thought it necessary, in view of what Mr. Kuznetsov had said, to make our position on this matter abundantly clear.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I was interested in what I have only just had time to read -- the declaration which our Soviet colleague referred to in his speech and which he has circulated to us. I am grateful to him for letting us have an English translation: I found the Russian just a little difficult to follow. Naturally we shall wish to consider it and to give our fully considered view on it in due course, but my immediate reaction is to say that I doubt very much whether the presentation of a declaration in this form is really helpful to this Conference because, once more, what this is really doing, it seems to me, is seeking to give advantage to the States which have large land masses, which are one cohesive whole, and to give disadvantage to those alliances which are widely spread and, particularly, to countries like my own which are islands. It does seem to me that this attempt to capitalize, as it were, on one's geographical position may be an astute political manoeuvre, but I do not think it really helps us forward in our task.

I have in the past made abundantly clear my own government's view on the problem of foreign bases as such and matters of that kind, with which the declaration is closely linked. I have always said that when we have an agreement on general and complete disarmament it will permeate every corner of the territories of the signatories and it will permeate every corner of their foreign bases. In other words, as the disarmament process goes on the reductions cannot, obviously, be limited to just one's home territory: they must have their effect over the whole field, and a 30 per cent reduction in armaments in a given period must very much affect the foreign bases. Of course they will go down pari passu with the rest. That inevitably must follow. Therefore to dramatize the question of foreign bases has never seemed to me to be helpful to us in our task, and I do hope very much that our Soviet colleagues will not keep on this particular aspect of their theme in relation to our disarmament proposals. I remember I was very much surprised when this whole concept was first put forward in this Conference chamber not quite a year ago. It never seemed to me to be justified. I have never heard any references to it which in fact do justify it, and I hope very much, therefore, that we will not be pressed in regard to matters of that sort. I recall that at one stage at the end of last summer I tried to put forward what seemed to me to be three basic difficulties in making progress in relation to our themes of general and complete disarmament, three problems on which I thought the Soviet Union was taking up an attitude which was not wholly reasonable.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

The question of foreign bases was one. The question of the demand for a 100 per cent reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage was a second. The third one was the question of verification, in regard to which they refused to discuss any means, other than the inspection of the actual destruction in relation to disarmament in the first stage, to check what in fact remains as well as what is in fact destroyed. Those three matters were fundamental difficulties in the way of our progress. Now on one of those, the question of nuclear delivery vehicles, I am glad to see that the Soviet Union has moved in some degree and has accepted the fact that it is unrealistic to propose the total elimination of these in the first stage. Of course, I do not think they have gone far enough, but at least, once they have started on that road, it is an encouragement to us, and I hope we shall make further progress there. However, on the other two points, they have so far not really come to grips with the problem and they have not really helped us forward. Therefore I say to Mr. Kuznetsov that I hope very much they will face up to these other two problems and that they will find some way of coming to meet what is absolutely essential, in my view, if we are to make progress.

Mr. Kuznetsov talked a good deal in his speech about concessions which the Soviet Union had made. I would say to him that certainly concessions have not been all on one side. I will come to the test ban in a moment, but on general and complete disarmament I would say to him that in fact such concessions as he has made have been concessions to common sense as exposed in the discussions around this table rather than concessions to the Western Powers. I would encourage him to make more concessions to common sense, for they will be welcomed by the other representatives around this table.

Now I should like to say a little about the problems of a test ban treaty, which has been the subject of a good deal of what has already been said this afternoon. Here I welcome -- and I welcome warmly -- the move forward which was made in the approach from Chairman Khrushchev just before Christmas and which formed the basis for the renewed discussions which took place in New York and Washington, first between the Soviet Union and the United States and latterly with the United Kingdom included, so as to represent, as it were, the Sub-Committee of this Conference. My country was very glad to participate in those discussions. Naturally, we are sorry that they have not led us to agreement at the present time. Nevertheless, we are obviously nearer to agreement than we have been before. We see a position now in which both sides are at least negotiating on a similar basis. In the past, ever since the Soviet Union repudiated the agreed experts' report in November 1961 and withdrew its agreement to obligatory on-site inspection -- from that day until the new proposals were made --

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

we have had the greatest difficulty in getting an agreement on the basis of our discussions. Now, however, we have a general agreement on a basis. The difference between us is largely one of numbers, and that obviously ought to be more susceptible of negotiation than any position we have had since November 1961.

The Western position here is, I think, well known. It is based on our best scientific evaluation, whether it be in relation to the detection posts required or to the on-site inspections that are needed. What we want is to be able not only to detect but to identify all suspicious events. To the extent that we cannot identify by national detection means, we must have some means of assisting and checking on national detection means and we must have at least a quota of on-site inspections. The Soviet Union has offered three on-site inspections. The position of the Western Powers is that we have agreed to eight to ten such inspections. The Western figure is of course a reduction on anything we have previously put forward and is an indication of our desire to reach agreement and of our determination to make use of every piece of the latest scientific information available which enables us to cut down the number of unidentified events.

The proposal for the automatic seismic stations originated with our Soviet colleagues last autumn (ENDC/SC.1/V.43, p.26). Strangely enough, they tried to give the British the credit for it -- I never understood why --, but actually it originated with them, and they have put this proposal more precisely in the recent discussions. They are proposing three of these automatic stations. For our part, we on the Western side do not believe this gives a sufficient degree of assurance in relation to recording by national detection systems. We want to see a somewhat higher figure.

Thus we are negotiating on two different bands of figures. The Western position has always been flexible, as I have indicated. It will always continue to be so, but it must be such that it will satisfy the scientific criteria available to us. In the past, our Soviet Colleagues have told us that they had better scientific information available. Even at this time, I understand, they have said they have put forward their new position for political reasons not based on scientific reasoning. Whatever the reason, I am glad they have moved forward in this way. However, I would say to them that, as far as the West is concerned, in order to reassure ourselves, it is necessary that we have a scientific basis of confidence here. I would say to them that this is an important factor for us. In fact, if our Soviet colleagues are saying to us that for them it is a purely political decision, I should have thought it would be easier for political reasons, if they really want agreement, to raise the figure beyond three.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

If, politically, the Soviet Union can accept three on-site inspections or three automatic seismic stations, I should have thought that it would not embarrass it politically, having accepted the principle, to accept a few more. After all, it is a very large country. I would encourage it to be flexible just as the West has been flexible. We in the West will certainly do all we can to reach agreement on this matter. We are very anxious indeed to reach agreement.

I am firmly convinced that the position is more encouraging, in spite of the fact that we have not yet completely eliminated the gap between us, but I hope very much that our Soviet colleagues will be able to come forward and meet us in these matters. I hope we shall have further discussion in the Sub-Committee in due course --- indeed, as soon as possible -- so that we can make progress. I am not going to be drawn into a polemical discussion about who is right and who is wrong with regard to when one tests. What I want is to see all testing eliminated. I think the record is clear enough for everybody to know where the responsibility lies, and I am not going to be drawn into questions of that sort which do not really help forward our discussions at all.

So I come back to saying that we must press forward with our discussions in relation to nuclear tests. However, we must not allow these anxieties and our desire to get a nuclear test agreement to cloud our sense of perspective as a whole. This Conference was set up eleven months ago as a Disarmament Conference. At the time it was set up, the chances of making progress on a test ban treaty seemed remote in the extreme. That did not prevent people from coming here anxious, willing and ready to talk about disarmament. Whilst we continue to thrash out these differences that remain in regard to nuclear tests, it is vital that we continue with our basic work of trying to thrash out the details of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I do emphasize the fact that we have got to go on with our ordinary discussion, and I would say that in general we have got to have a sense of realism in these matters. Our success here is dependent in very large degree on the relaxation of world tension. I believe there has been some degree of relaxation of world tension in recent months, and we can help the relaxation of world tension to the extent that we are able to reach agreements on any particular matters. But to the extent that world tension can be relaxed by other decisions taken outside, taken elsewhere, that will help us enormously too. The two things go together. We must try, in those fields where we can find agreement, to relax tensions among ourselves and to spread the effect. We must hope that the work of others in the capitals of the world will make it possible



(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

for other tensions that exist to be relaxed. While this is happening we should be thrashing out the pragmatic approaches to, the detailed discussion of, the various matters that can go into our final treaty so that as the international climate becomes better we will have done our homework and the position will be that we will have a sound basis for the lasting treaties we all want. The matters are complementary -- what we do here and what happens outside. I merely want to make that point because there are times when some of us feel a little discouraged in relation to our work here, but I hope we will not allow that to prevent us from making a very great effort at this resumed session. I pledge the United Kingdom delegation to play its full part. We will do our best to try to understand the points of view put to us from other quarters and not get drawn into polemical discussion. I will not commit myself never to get drawn into it; there are occasions when one is sorely tempted. But it is our desire that we shall continue our discussions on a sound basis and we hope very much we shall be able to make further progress.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): We have all listened to the extremely interesting and important statements which have been made, and my delegation would like to reserve the right to study the texts and to speak at the next meeting. Mr. Godber referred to our procedures, and that is why I have asked for the floor. I entirely agree with his proposals, especially in regard to the possibility of reinstating the Committee of the Whole to debate collateral measures of disarmament, in which field I hope that we may do useful and practical work. But I particularly agree with him that the meetings of the nuclear Sub-Committee should be resumed as soon as possible, and that no one here intends to inhibit discussion on the problem of nuclear tests. Those are indeed the problems upon which the whole attention of the world is now concentrated. I think that we should now reflect on the reports submitted by the three delegations of the nuclear Powers on their recent activities in Washington and in New York, and I want to thank the three delegations for the most important information that they have given us. But I should like to ask you now, Mr. Chairman, to allow the Committee first to direct its attention to the problem of tests, which at the present moment is the outstandingly important subject. On previous occasions the Committee has decided to discuss the problem of tests at every meeting so long as there were speakers on the list for its discussion. I should like to propose that the Committee adopt the same procedure now, so that we may really devote to this problem of capital importance all the extensive consideration which it both deserves and demands.

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): The representative of the United States of America has the floor in the exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I simply wish to take a moment or two to comment on one or two points raised by the Soviet representative in the course of his remarks. Prior to that, I should like to thank our United Kingdom colleague for his kind remarks on Mr. Dean, who contributed so much to these deliberations.

The Soviet representative raised many points which will require a rather full reply. My United Kingdom colleague has mentioned some of those points, and in due course we should like to comment at greater length on some of them, such as the Nassau arrangements, the multilateral force and the United States relations with Canada.

However, there is one particular point to which I should like to reply today and that has to do with the comments on the underground nuclear tests where the Soviet representative has just charged that the United States resumed such tests this past week. He further added that this alleged resumption of underground testing by the United States would tend to make progress at these discussions here more difficult. I should like to remind the Soviet representative that this is not the establishment of a new series of tests, as he implied. The United States began its series of underground nuclear tests in September 1961 immediately after the Soviet Union had violently and suddenly broken its unilateral commitment with regard to a cessation of such tests. The underground series we undertook at that time has continued and has never been terminated. However, it is true that there were certain tests of this series which were deferred -- and deferred during the recent past -- and I think that in order to make clear the circumstances surrounding that deferment I should quote from President Kennedy's statement of 26 January 1963:

"During present discussions in Washington and New York on the nuclear test ban treaty among the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States I have asked the Atomic Energy Commission to postpone underground shots in Nevada. We are maintaining the capability and readiness to resume our test programme at any time. We have no intention of again accepting an indefinite moratorium on testing, and if it is clear we cannot achieve a workable agreement we will act accordingly".

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The discussion to which the President referred terminated on 31 January, and at that point the postponement of the testing was also terminated. I think our United Kingdom colleague has indicated the necessity for each of us to continue with whatever preparations are deemed essential for our national security, and it is for that purpose that those tests were reinstituted, and will have to be reinstituted until such time as we are able to achieve a dependable agreement to terminate all tests for all time.

In that connexion, I would like to respond to the clear and simple question which our Soviet colleague has asked us. He asked whether it was the intention and desire of the United States to conclude a treaty ending nuclear tests, and I again reiterate as I did in my prepared remarks that the United States wants and will do everything in its power to achieve an early, sound treaty which could lead to the elimination of nuclear tests in all environments.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I, too, should like to exercise my right of reply and make a few brief remarks in connexion with the statements made by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom.

To begin with, I should like to reply to the United Kingdom representative's appeal, which he has addressed, apparently, to the representatives of the Soviet Union, not to engage in polemics. It seems to me that first and foremost this appeal applies precisely to the representative of the United Kingdom. The representative of the Soviet Union endeavoured in his statement to give the Committee a clear idea of the most important problems which we think should be considered by the Committee immediately with a view to taking a positive step and achieving definite success in solving the problems set before us. I think we shall have an opportunity afterwards to exchange views in greater detail on the questions which the representative of the United Kingdom has touched upon. But in order to establish the truth I should like to speak on a few points relating to the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. First of all, regarding the question of tests. The fact remains that the United States Government has resumed testing at the present time, and no matter what arguments may be put forward, this resumption of tests is manifestly contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations. It is aimed, of course, at intensifying the armaments race, and, in fact, Mr. Godber confirmed that the Government of the United Kingdom is not unwilling to continue the armaments race.

(Mr. Kuznetsov/ USSR)

Now for the explanations given by Mr. Foster alleging that this resumption is by way of a reply to tests conducted by the Soviet Union. We have dealt with this subject in detail and have reverted to it several times, as you know. It has been shown quite convincingly in the past, that it was not the Soviet Union that started nuclear tests, nor was it the Soviet Union that continued them. The Soviet Union was compelled each time to undertake only appropriate measures in reply in order to safeguard its security. The facts show that one side is trying to create an impression which is not in accordance with reality. There are figures -- they were published recently in the American press -- which show that the United States carried out in all more than 250 nuclear explosions. During the same period, the Soviet Union carried out a considerably smaller number of such explosions.

In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the basis of the approach to the solution of the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests should be the real correlation of forces which actually exists at the present time, and the advances in science and technology should be taken into account. In this connexion, I should like to remind Mr. Godber that it was not the Soviet Union that rejected the conclusions of the scientists. As is well known, it was our Western partners who rejected those conclusions which were drafted as far back as 1958 (EXP/NUC/28).

When it seemed that a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests could almost be regarded as within reach, they put forward new demands, and expressed doubts about the recommendations made by the scientists. After this, they started numerous discussions and put forward many demands for additional research and for the further collection of data and so on. And you know that one can go on with this work endlessly without ever coming to an agreement, if, of course, there is no desire for this agreement.

Further, in regard to the draft declaration submitted by the Soviet Union on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons, I should also like to say that one should not approach proposals which are submitted here with the yardstick that if a proposal is not to the liking of one or other of the delegations, it should not have been submitted. This is a very strange approach, and it should not take place in the work of our Committee. Mr. Godber has just said that the draft declaration is not to the liking of the United Kingdom delegation as it is not in keeping with their views, and therefore such proposals should not have been submitted. It seems to me that we should approach in a different way the proposals and views which are put forward. We should see to what extent any

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

particular proposal answers to the purpose of accomplishing our basic task, to what extent any proposal helps towards solving our general problem, namely, the earliest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. I think it is from these positions that one should approach the proposal we have submitted in the form of a draft declaration. It is our firm conviction that this proposal has only one "astuteness" in its purpose, namely, to make a positive contribution to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament and to take a step forward and bring its solution closer.

I think that if other proposals also are really aimed at helping to solve this basic problem, we should welcome them. Therefore I appeal to the members of the Committee not to reject any proposals straightaway without even having had time to study them as they should, and not to approach them with a preconceived opinion, but to examine and study them and try to find in them what may be useful for the solution of the problem.

In conclusion, I should like to stress once again that it is the sincere desire of the Soviet Union to do everything possible to make the most of every opportunity and every means in order to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament as quickly as possible and for this purpose to solve first of all those partial problems which are less important than the basic problem, but can help towards solving it as quickly as possible.

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico): I should like to inform the Committee now that the co-Chairmen have recommended that this week's meetings of the Conference be held on Thursday 14 and Friday 15 February at 10.30 a.m. If there are no objections, I shall take that proposal as accepted, and the next meeting will therefore be on Thursday, 14 February at 10.30 a.m.

It was so decided.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Will the next meeting of the Conference be mainly taken up with the question of nuclear tests?

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): As regards the actual procedure and the consideration of items, I take the liberty of informing the Committee briefly of what the two co-Chairmen agreed upon yesterday. We agreed that if there is a desire on the part of the members of the Committee to exchange views and express their opinions in general on the problem,

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

it would perhaps be appropriate not to place any restriction on the members of the Committee and to give them an opportunity of expressing their views, not only on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, but also on all the other questions relating to the problem of disarmament. We thought that if there were any members who so desired, we could assign as much time as necessary to a general debate. We felt that after an exchange of views on a general level it would be possible to see more clearly how to organize our work in the future, and we could have further consultations in this regard.

Today I have not spoken on questions of procedure, because yesterday I agreed with the co-Chairman that we would return to this question after we have heard the statements of the members of the Committee so as to take into account their views and wishes. Therefore, perhaps, we could devote the next meeting to hearing the statements of members of the Committee who wish to speak in general on the problem of disarmament, and then if there are any further speakers, we could continue the debate on Friday. It would hardly be proper to oblige the members of the Committee to speak only on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. After all, we are now meeting after a fairly long recess. During that time important events have taken place in the world and obviously the members of the Committee should not now be restricted to speaking only on the problem of the cessation of tests, even though it is a very important one. This will make it easier for the co-Chairmen to work out concrete recommendations.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I simply wish to endorse what the Soviet co-Chairman has just said. This does reflect our discussions yesterday. We felt that the representatives themselves could best select the subjects which they would like to bring before the plenary meetings.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its ninety-sixth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Padilla Nervo, the representative of Mexico.

"An opening statement was made by the Chairman.

"After the conclusion of the open part of the meeting, statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Italy.

"The Delegation of the USSR tabled a declaration on the renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 14 February 1963 at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.

